Nearly a quarter-century after Paul Volcker's declaration of war on inflation on October 6, 1979, Alan Greenspan declared that the goal had been achieved. Drawing on the extensive historical record, I examine the views of Chairmen Volcker and Greenspan on some aspects of the evolving monetary policy debate and explore some of the distinguishing characteristics of the disinflation.
Nearly a quarter-century after Paul Volcker's declaration of war on inflation on October 6, 1979, Alan Greenspan, his successor at the helm of the Federal Reserve, declared that the goal had been achieved: "Our goal of price stability was achieved by most analysts' definition by mid-2003. Unstinting and largely preemptive efforts over two decades had finally paid off." (2004, p. 35.) The policies of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) under the leadership of Chairmen Volcker and Greenspan not only successfully reestablished an environment of price stability but also contributed to a remarkable period of economic stability and prosperity. Following an initial phase of dislocation and rapid disinflation, inflation stabilized-first near four percent and, over the past dozen or so years, closer to two percent-as measured by the core CPI and PCE indexes (Figure 1) .
1 Also, the volatility of economic activity declined markedly and over the past decade productivity accelerated.
It is too early to separate the role of monetary policy from other factors that may have contributed to this incredible overall improvement of the macroeconomic fortunes of the United States during the Volcker-Greenspan era. However, the policies leading to the restoration of price stability undoubtedly had a significant, positive role, a conclusion as inescapable as recognition of the deleterious effect of policy on macroeconomic performance during the Great Inflation that preceded the disinflation. Instead, he suggested a qualitative metric: "Rather, price stability is best thought of as an environment in which inflation is so low and stable over time that it does not materially enter into the decisions of households and firms" (2002, p. 6).
The limitations of measuring the general price level with any one specific index can be highlighted by examining the differences in alternative inflation measures (Fig-ure 2) . Especially near price stability, reliance on any specific measure for guidance could be problematic. The difficulty of selecting just one imperfect measure, among many plausible alternatives, may also explain why the FOMC has multiple times switched the index employed to communicate its inflation outlook (Figure 3-A) .
By espousing a qualitative definition, Chairman Greenspan also reaffirmed continuity with Chairman Volcker, who remarked: "A workable definition of reasonable 'price stability' would seem to me to be a situation in which expectations of generally rising (or falling) prices over a considerable period are not a pervasive influence on economic and financial behavior. Stated more positively, 'stability' would imply that decision-making should be able to proceed on the basis that 'real' and 'nominal' values are substantially the same over the planning horizon-and that planning horizons should be suitably long." (December 28, 1983.) III. Policy Implementation Both Chairmen also identified the value of preempting destabilizing forces, when possible. However, they often questioned the reliability of forecasts that are necessary for implementing preemptive policy and expressed doubts about the utility of econometric models for policy advice.
In light of their prevalence in theoretical discussions of the policy process, particularly notable has been Chairman Greenspan's rejection of the operational usefulness of various natural rate concepts and associated gaps as policy guides (e.g. the output gap, the unemployment gap and the interest-rate gap). Responding to a question regarding "the so-called 'natural rate' of unemployment" on June 22, 1994, Chairman
Greenspan pointed out that " [w] hile the idea of a national 'threshold' at which shortterm inflation rises or falls is statistically appealing, it is very difficult in practice to arrive at useful estimates that would identify such a natural rate." He concluded: "In light of these uncertainties, I do not think that any one estimate of the natural rate is useful in the formulation of monetary policy."
Similarly, responding to questions regarding the "neutral" rate of interest, he replied: "Although the concept of a 'neutral interest rate' is a useful theoretical construct, difficulties in implementing it in practice limit its usefulness as a framework While incipient increases in inflation were actively resisted throughout the period, the pursuit of persistent economic weakness implied by conventional disinflation approaches was avoided once inflation stabilized near four percent. Further progress toward price stability appears more consistent with the opportunistic approach to disinflation, which may also help explain its modest cost (Orphanides and Wilcox, 2002) . Progress could be attributed to the 1990 and 2001 recessions, and, during the 1990s, to the unexpected acceleration in productivity, which kept both inflation and unemployment systematically on the low side of FOMC projections (Figure 3 ).
IV. Concluding Remarks
The remarkable quarter-century-long journey to price stability defies characterization in terms of the simple models typically employed for theoretical treatments of monetary policy. This has been interpreted as evidence of a considerable discretionary element in policy decisions. Nonetheless, the policies of the Volcker-Greenspan-led FOMC reversed the legacy of distortions and instabilities associated with the Great Inflation and avoided repeating the policy errors that led to it. Ultimately, monetary policy in the Volcker-Greenspan era has been remarkably systematic, and it succeeded by focusing on "maximizing the probabilities of achieving our goals of price stability and the maximum sustainable economic growth that we associate with it." (Greenspan, 2004, p. 37) 
